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Abstract. There are several contexts of non-monotonic reasoning where a prior-7
ity between rules is established whose purpose is preventing conflicts.8
One formalism that has been widely employed for non-monotonic reasoning is9
the sceptical one known as Defeasible Logic. In Defeasible Logic the tool used10
for conflict resolution is a preference relation between rules, that establishes the11
priority among them.12
In this paper we investigate how to modify such a preference relation in a de-13
feasible logic theory in order to change the conclusions of the theory itself. We14
argue that the approach we adopt is applicable to legal reasoning where users, in15
general, cannot change facts or rules, but can propose their preferences about the16
relative strength of the rules.17
We provide a comprehensive study of the possible combinatorial cases and we18
identify and analyse the cases where the revision process is successful.19
After this analysis, we identify three revision/update operators and study them20
against the AGM postulates for belief revision operators, to discover that only a21
part of these postulates are satisfied by the three operators.22
Keywords. Knowledge representation, non-monotonic reasoning, sceptical logics, be-23
lief revision.24
1 Introduction25
A large number of real-life cases in legal reasoning, information security, digital foren-26
sics, and even engineering or medical diagnosis, exhibit the two following circum-27
stances: (a) different persons have different preferences, and (b) decision making de-28
pends upon the order the rules are applied. When the decision mechanism is based on29
rules, and the rules are in conflict, then inconsistencies may be generated, and deci-30
sion making may require preferences to solve/avoid conflicts. It may occur that, under31
certain circumstances, using a particular set of preferences to solve a conflict does not32
result in the desired/expected outcome. Accordingly, to revise the outcome we can re-33
vise the underlying preferences.34
Non-monotonic reasoning has been advanced for common-sense reasoning and rea-35
soning with partial and conflicting information. We can distinguish two types of non-36
monotonic reasoning: credulous and sceptical. In credulous non-monotonic reasoning,37
once a conflict arises, we independently explore the two branches of the conflict, while38
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in sceptical non-monotonic reasoning a conflict must be solved before proceeding with39
the reasoning. Here we concentrate on sceptical non-monotonic reasoning.40
Typically sceptical non-monotonic formalisms are equipped with techniques to ad-41
dress conflicts, where a conflict is a combination of reasoning chains leading to a con-42
tradiction. The most common device to handle conflicts is a preference or superiority43
relation over the elements used by the formalism to reason. These elements can be for-44
mulae, axioms, rules or arguments, and the preference relation states that one of such45
elements is to be preferred to another one when both can be used.46
In this research we focus on a specific rule-based non-monotonic formalism, Defea-47
sible Logic, but the motivation behind the particular technical development applies in48
general to other rule-based non-monotonic formalisms equipped with a priority about49
rules. Indeed, considering a rule based formalism, knowledge is partitioned in facts50
(describing immutable propositions/statements about a case), rules (describing rela-51
tionships between a set of premises and a conclusion), and a preference relation or52
superiority relation (describing the relative strength of rules). A revision operation153
transforms a theory by changing some of its elements, be it the facts, rules, or supe-54
riority relation. Revision based on change of facts corresponds to an update operation55
[1], revision based on modification of rules has been investigated in [2], whilst to the56
best of our knowledge, revision of non-monotonic theories based on modifications of57
the underlying superiority relation has been neglected so far.58
In this paper we study revision of defeasible theories operating on the superiority59
relation. We begin by arguing that, while little attention has been dedicated to this topic,60
it has natural correspondences to reasoning patterns in legal reasoning. After that, we61
investigate the type of operations that are possible for this kind of revision.62
Once we introduced the operation, it is only natural to follow by establishing which63
properties they enjoy. The properties that are significant for revision operations in belief64
revision in order to be rational have already been isolated in a systematic view proposed65
by Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson [3], namely the AGM postulates.66
The AGM postulates where designed with classical logic in mind. Classical logic67
is monotonic, therefore if we add new information which is incompatible with the old68
one, an inconsistency arises. In this scenario, the sole way to recover consistency is to69
invoke a revision operator.70
Conversely, due to the nature of non-monotonic reasoning, adding new “incompat-71
ible” information in a non-monotonic system usually does not generate a contradiction72
within the theory, even if the result may not be conceptually satisfactory.73
Given the difference in nature between classical logic and non-monotonic reason-74
ing, it is of interest to investigate which AGM postulates apply to non-monotonic rea-75
soning, to what extent, and in which form they apply.76
In the recent years, a few works addressed the issue of belief revision in non-77
monotonic logics where there is a general understanding that the AGM postulates are78
not fully appropriate for non-monotonic reasoning. For example, [4] shows that belief79
revision methodologies are not suitable to changes in specific significant non-monotonic80
1 In general we will use the term revision operation to denote any operation that changes a
theory. In Sections 4 and 5 the term will be understood in a specific technical sense.
theories, and that it is possible to revise such theories fully satisfying the AGM postu-81
lates, but then the outcome is utterly meaningless for their purposes.82
Still, the matter whether and which postulates hold is far from being settled. For83
example, [5] proposed an approach to belief revision of logic programs under answer84
set semantics that is fully compliant with the base AGM postulates for revision. On85
the other hand, Delgrande [6, p. 568] asserts that a subset of postulates for belief re-86
vision is not appropriate for belief revision of non-monotonic theories (and thus is ig-87
nored in his work), while we will argue in Section 5 that the same postulates can be88
adopted(Alternativa: are meaningful) in our approach. This suggests that the suitability89
of AGM postulates to a belief revision approach for non-monotonic reasoning is still90
debatable.91
The paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we motivate that reasoning over pref-92
erences on rules and on how to modify the preferences is a natural reasoning pattern in93
legal reasoning. Then, in Section 3 we introduce Defeasible Logic, the formalism cho-94
sen for our investigation; in particular, we introduce new auxiliary proof tags to describe95
derivations in Defeasible Logic. The new proof tags do not modify the expressive power96
of the logic, but they identify patterns where instances of the superiority relation con-97
tribute to the derivation of a conclusion. Armed with this technical machinery, in Sec-98
tion 4 we start by proving that the problem of revising a theory changing the superiority99
relation is, in general, an NP-complete problem; secondly, we provide an exhaustive100
analysis of the cases and conditions under which revision operations modifying only101
the superiority relation are successful. Section 5 analyses the AGM postulates against102
the introduced operators. Section 6 overviews closely related approaches, and Section 7103
concludes the paper with a summary of the achieved results, discussion of related works104
and quick hints for future developments.105
2 Norms and Preferences in Legal Reasoning106
It has been argued [7] that some aspects of legal reasoning can be captured by non-107
monotonic rule-based formalisms. The main intuition is that norms can be represented108
by rules, the evidence in cases by facts, and that the superiority relation is induced by109
legal principles determining how to solve conflicts between norms.110
We take the stance that, typically in the legal reasoning domain, we do not have111
control over the rules (norms) or their modification, but have some control on how they112
can be used. An average citizen has no power to change the Law, and has no power113
on what norms are effective in the jurisdiction she is situated in. These powers instead114
are reserved to persons, entities and institutions specifically designated to do so, for115
example the parliament and, under some given constraints, also by judges (in Common116
Law juridical system, especially).117
However, a citizen can argue that one norm instead of another applies in a specific118
case. This amounts to saying that one norm is to be preferred to the other in the case.119
Prima-facie conflicts appear in legal systems for a few main reasons, among which120
we can easily identify three major representatives: (1) norms from different sources,121
(2) norms emitted at different times, and (3) exceptions. These phenomena are well122
understood and have given rise to principles which existed for a long time in legal theory123
and been used to solve such issues. These principles are still used in many situations,124
such as an argument to drive constitutional judgement against a given norm or a given125
sentence. Here we list the three major legal principles, expressing preferences among126
rules to be applied [8].127
Lex Superior This principle states that when there is a conflict between two norms128
from different sources, the norms originating from the legislative source higher in129
the legislative source hierarchy takes precedence over the other norm. This means130
that if there is a conflict between a federal law and a state law, the federal law131
prevails over the state law.132
Lex Posterior According to this principle, a norm emitted after another norm takes133
precedence over the older norm.134
Lex Specialis This principle states that when a norm is limited to a specific set of135
admissible circumstances, and under more general conditions another norm applies,136
the most specific norm prevails.137
Besides the above principles a legislator can explicitly establish that one norm pre-138
vails over a conflicting norm.139
The intuition behind these principles (and eventually others) is that when there are140
two conflicting norms, and the two norms are applicable in a specific case, we can apply141
one of these principles to create an instance of a superiority relation that discriminates142
between the two conflicting norms. However, there are further complications. What if143
several principles apply and these produce opposite preferences? Do the preferences144
lead to opposite outcomes of a case? These are examples of situations when revision of145
preferences is relevant. The following example illustrates this situation.146
Charlie is an immigrant son of an italian, and living in Italy, who is interested in147
joining the Italian Army, based on Law 91 of 1992. However, his application is rejected,148
based upon a constitutional norm (Article 51 of the Italian Constitution). The two norms149
Law 91 and Article 51 are in conflict, thus the Army’s decision is based on the lex150
superior principle. Charlie appeals against the decision in court. The facts of the case151
are undisputed, and so are the norms to be applied and their interpretation. Thus the152
only chance for Bob, Charlie’s lawyer, to overturn the decision is to argue that Law 91153
overrides Article 51 of the Constitution. Thus Bob counter-argues appealing to the lex154
specialis principle since Law 91 of 1992 explicitly covers the case of a foreigner who155
applies for joining the Army for the purpose of obtaining citizenship.156
The two arguments do not discuss about facts and rules that hold in the case. They157
disagree about which rule prevails over the other, Article 51 of the Constitution or Law158
91. In particular, Bob’s argument can be seen as an argument where the relative strength159
of the two rules is reversed compared to the argument of the Army’s lawyer, and it can160
be used to revise the previous decision.161
While the mechanism sketched above concerns the notion of strategic reasoning,162
where a discussant looks at the best argument to be used in a case to prove a given163
claim, in this case, that one rule prevails over another rule. However, the key aspect164
is that before embarking in this kind of arguments, one has to ensure that changing a165
preference leads to a different outcome of the claim of the case. It is not our aim to166
study how to justify preferences using argumentation. In this work, we investigate if it167
is possible to modify the extension of a theory (as represented by a defeasible theory)168
only through changes on the superiority (preference) relation. Thus, we believe that169
our framework is foundational for argumentation of preferences. This means that one170
can first determine whether the outcome of a discussion can be turned in her favour171
only changing the superiority relation, and then to figure out which argument (if any)172
supports the preference.173
In the current literature about formalisms apt to model normative and legal reason-174
ing, a simple and efficient non-monotonic formalism which has been discussed in the175
community is Defeasible Logic. This system is described in detail in the next sections.176
One of the strong aspects of Defeasible Logic is its characterisation in terms of ar-177
gumentation semantics [9]. In other words, it is possible to relate it to general reasoning178
structure in non-monotonic reasoning which is based on the notion of admissible rea-179
soning chain. An admissible reasoning chain is an argument in favour of a thesis. For180
these reasons, much research effort has been spent upon Defeasible Logic, and once181
formulated in a complete way it encompasses other (sceptical) formalisms proposed for182
legal reasoning [9,10,11].183
Most interestingly, in Defeasible Logic we can reach positive conclusions as well as184
negative conclusions, thus it gives understanding to both accept a conclusion as well as185
reject a conclusion. This is particularly advantageous when trying to address the issues186
determined by reasoning conflicts.187
It has been pointed out that the AGM framework for belief revision is not always188
appropriate for legal reasoning [4]. Moreover, it is not clear how to apply AGM to pref-189
erence revision. Accordingly, this paper provides a comprehensive study of the condi-190
tions under which it is possible to revise a defeasible theory by changing the superiority191
relation of the theory,192
3 Defeasible Logic193
A defeasible theory consists of five different kinds of knowledge: facts, strict rules,194
defeasible rules, defeaters, and a superiority relation [12]. Examples of facts and rules195
below are standard in the literature of the field.196
Facts denote simple pieces of information that are considered always to be true. For197
example, a fact is that “Sylvester is a cat”, formally cat(Sylvester). A rule r consists198
of its antecedent A(r) which is a finite set of literals, an arrow, and its consequent199
(or head) C(r), which is a single literal. A strict rule is a rule in which whenever the200
premises are indisputable (e.g., facts), then so is the conclusion. For example,201
cat(X)→ mammal(X)
means that “every cat is a mammal”. A defeasible rule is a rule that can be defeated by202
contrary evidence; for example, “cats typically eat birds”:203
cat(X)⇒ eatBirds(X).
The underlying idea is that if we know that something is a cat, then we may conclude204
that it eats birds, unless there is evidence proving otherwise. Defeaters are rules that205
cannot be used to draw any conclusion. Their only use is to prevent some conclusions,206
i.e., to defeat defeasible rules by producing evidence to the contrary. An example is “if207
a cat has just fed itself, then it might not eat birds”:208
justFed(X); ¬eatBirds(X).
The superiority relation among rules is used to define where one rule may override209
the conclusion of another one, e.g., given the defeasible rules210
r : cat(X)⇒ eatBirds(X)
r′ : domesticCat(X)⇒ ¬eatBirds(X)
which would contradict one another if Sylvester is both a cat and a domestic cat, they do211
not in fact contradict if we state that r′ wins against r, leading Sylvester not to eat birds.212
Notice that in Defeasible Logic the superiority relation determines the relative strength213
of two conflicting rules, i.e., rules whose heads are complementary. The complementary214
of a literal q is denoted by ∼q; if q is a positive literal p, then ∼q is ¬p, and if q is a215
negative literal ¬p then ∼q is p.216
Like in [12], we consider only a propositional version of this logic, and we do not217
take into account function symbols. Every expression with variables represents the finite218
set of its variable-free instances.219
A defeasible theory D is a triple (F,R,>), where F is a finite consistent set of literals220
called facts, R is a finite set of rules, and > is an acyclic superiority relation on R; given221
two rules r and s, we will use the infix notation r > s to mean that (r,s) ∈>. The set of222
all strict rules in R is denoted by Rs, and the set of strict and defeasible rules by Rsd . We223
name R[q] the rule set in R with head q. A conclusion of D is a tagged literal and can224
have one of the following forms:225
1. +∆q, which means that q is definitely provable in D, i.e., there is a definite proof for226
q, that is a proof using facts, and strict rules only;227
2. −∆q, which means that q is definitely not provable in D (i.e., a definite proof for q228
does not exist);229
3. +∂q, which means that q is defeasibly provable in D;230
4. −∂q, which means that q is not defeasibly provable, or refuted in D.231
A proof (or derivation) is a finite sequence P = (P(1), . . . ,P(i)) of tagged literals232
where for each n, 0≤ n≤ i the following conditions (proof conditions) are satisfied and233
P(1..i) denotes the initial part of the sequence of length i.234
+∆ : If P(n+1) = +∆q then
(1) q ∈ F or
(2) ∃r ∈ Rs[q]∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆a ∈ P(1..n).
The negative proof conditions for ∆ are the strong negation of the positive coun-235
terpart: this is closely related to the function that simplifies a formula by moving all236
negations to an inner most position in the resulting formula, and replaces the positive237
tags with the respective negative tags, and the other way around [13,14].238
−∆ : If P(n+1) =−∆q then
(1) q /∈ F and
(2) ∀r ∈ Rs[q]∃a ∈ A(r) :−∆a ∈ P(1..n).
The proof conditions just given are meant to represent forward chaining of facts and239
strict rules (+∆ ), and that it is not possible to obtain a conclusion just by using forward240
chaining of facts and strict rules (−∆ ).241
The proof conditions for ±∂ are as follows:242
+∂ : If P(n+1) = +∂q then either
(1) +∆q ∈ P(1..n), or
(2) (2.1) −∆∼q ∈ P(1..n) and
(2.2) ∃r ∈ Rsd [q] such that ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P(1..n) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) such that −∂a ∈ P(1..n), or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd [q] such that
∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂a ∈ P(1..n) and t > s.
−∂ : If P(n+1) =−∂q then
(1) +∆q 6∈ P(1..n) and either
(2) (2.1) +∆∼q ∈ P(1..n), or
(2.2) ∀r ∈ Rsd [q] ∃a ∈ A(r) :−∂a ∈ P(1..n) or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that
(2.3.1) ∀a ∈ A(s) : +∂a ∈ P(1..n) and
(2.3.2) ∀t ∈ Rsd [q] either
∃a ∈ A(t) :−∂a ∈ P(1..n), or t 6> s.
The main idea of the conditions for a defeasible proof (+∂ ) is that there is an ap-243
plicable rule (i.e., a rule where all the antecedents are defeasibly proved) and every rule244
for the opposite conclusion is either discarded (i.e., one of the antecedents is not defea-245
sibly provable) or defeated by a stronger applicable rule for the conclusion we want to246
prove. The conditions for the negative proof tags (e.g., −∂ ) show that any systematic247
attempt to defeasibly prove the conclusion fails. The conditions for +∆ and −∆ , and248
+∂ and −∂ are related by the Principle of Strong Negation introduced in [13]. The key249
idea behind this principle is that conclusions labelled with a negative proof tag are the250
outcome of a constructive proof that the corresponding positive conclusion cannot be251
obtained (and the other way around). The principle states that the inference conditions252
for a pair of proof tags +# and−# are the strong negation of the other, where the strong253
negation of a condition corresponds essentially to the function that simplifies a formula254
by moving all negations to an innermost position in the resulting formula (for the full255
details see [13]).256
As usual, given a proof tag #, a literal p and a theory D, we use D ` ±#p to denote257
that there is a proof P in D where for some line i, P(i) = ±#p. Alternatively, we say258
that ±#p holds in D, or simply ±#p holds when the theory is clear from the context.259
The set of positive and negative conclusion is called extension. Formally,260
Definition 1 Given a defeasible theory D, the defeasible extension of D is defined as261
E(D) = (+∂ ,−∂ ),
where ±∂ = {l : l appears in D and D ` ±∂ l}.262
Due to the nature of the revision operators discussed in this paper, the extension263
does not contain strict conclusions since the only way to modify them is to operate on264
the set of strict rules (i.e., addition or removal). Similarly, the extension will not include265
information about the proof tags introduced below. Such proof tags are useful to identify266
structures in proofs and where to operate in the theory, but they do not specify what is267
defeasibly provable, or not.268
The inference mechanism of Defeasible Logic does not allow us to derive inconsis-269
tencies unless the monotonic part of the logic is inconsistent, as clarified by the follow-270
ing definition.271
Definition 2 A defeasible theory D is inconsistent iff there exists a literal p such that272
((D `+∂ p and D `+∂∼p) iff (D `+∆ p and D `+∆∼p)).273
In this paper, we do not make use of strict rules, nor defeaters2, since every revision274
changes only the priority among defeasible rules (the only rules that act in our frame-275
work), but we need to introduce eight new types of auxiliary tagged literals, whose276
meaning is clarified in Example 1. As it will be clear in the remainder, they will be277
significantly useful in simplifying the categorisation process, and consequently, the re-278
vision calculus.279
Example 1. Let D be the following defeasible theory:280
F = /0
R = {r1 :⇒ a r7 :⇒ b
r2 : a⇒ c r8 :⇒¬c
r3 : c⇒ d r9 :⇒¬b
r4 :⇒¬a r10 :⇒ e
r5 :⇒¬d r11 :⇒ f}
r6 : ¬d⇒ p
>= {(r1,r4),(r5,r3)}.
To improve readability, from now on we use the following graphical notation to repre-281
sent a theory like the previous one:282
2 The restriction does not result in any loss of generality: (1) the superiority relation does not
play any role in proving definite conclusions, and (2) for defeasible conclusions [12] proves
that it is always possible to remove (a) strict rules from the superiority relation and (b) defeaters
from the theory to obtain an equivalent theory without defeaters and where the strict rules are
not involved in the superiority relation. A consequence of this assumption is that the theories
we work with in this paper are consistent.
⇒r1 a ⇒r2 c ⇒r3 d
∨ ∧
⇒r4 ¬a ⇒r5 ¬d⇒r6 p
⇒r7 b ⇒r8 ¬c
⇒r9 ¬b
⇒r10 e ⇒r11 f
where the ∧ and ∨ symbols in the graphical representation of a theory are not conjunc-283
tions and disjunctions but they represent the superiority relation >. In the example, ∨284
means that r1 > r4 and ∧ that r5 > r3.285
A conclusion in a defeasible proof can now take one or more of the following forms:286
5. +Σq, which means there is a reasoning chain supporting q;287
– r1, r2, r3 form a chain supporting literal d (+Σd).288
6. −Σq, which means there is no reasoning chain supporting q;289
– Since there are no rules for literal ¬p, then we have −Σ¬p.290
7. +σq, which means there exists a reasoning chain supporting q that is not defeated291
by any applicable reasoning chain attacking it;292
– r1, r2 and r7, r8 are two undefeated chains for c and ¬c, respectively; Thus, we293
have +σc, +σ¬c.294
8. −σq, which means that every reasoning chain supporting q is attacked by an appli-295
cable reasoning chain;296
– Every chain for d is defeated (−σd, notice that there exists only one in this297
case).298
9. +ωq, which means there exists a reasoning chain supporting q that defeasibly proves299
all its antecedents;300
– In the chain r1, r2, r3, only rule r3 is defeated, hence +ωd holds.301
10. −ωq, which means that in every reasoning chain supporting q, at least one of its302
antecedents is not defeasibly provable.303
– Since +∂b does not hold, we can conclude −ω¬c.304
11. +ϕq, which means there exists a reasoning chain that defeasibly proves q made of305
elements such that there does not exist any rule for the opposite conclusion;306
– There are no rules for ¬e, thus +ϕe holds.307
12. −ϕq, which means that for every reasoning chain supporting q there exists an ele-308
ment such that a rule for the opposite conclusion could fire;309
– r4 supports ¬a, hence we have −ϕa.310
The tagged literals are formally defined by the following proof conditions. Again,311
the negative counterparts are obtained by the principle of strong negation. An important312
consequence of using this principle to formulate the conditions for asserting tagged313
literals is that for any literal p and any proof tag #, it is not possible to have both +#p314
and −#p (the interested reader is referred to [13,14]).315
Such proof tags identify structures of rules and demonstrations that are significant316
for the revision operations when we change the superiority relation. For example, +Σ p317
means that we could use Modus Ponens (or forward chaining) for deriving +∂ p.318
+Σ : If P(n+1) = +Σq then
(1) +∆q ∈ P(1..n) or
(2) ∃r ∈ Rsd [q] such that ∀a ∈ A(r) : +Σa ∈ P(1..n)
−Σ : If P(n+1) =−Σq then
(1) +∆q 6∈ P(1..n) and
(2) ∀r ∈ Rsd [q] : ∃a ∈ A(r) such that −Σa ∈ P(1..n)
The definitions of ±Σ formalise the concept of chain leading to a given literal.319
With respect of the analysis on how to change a theory by only acting on the supe-320
riority relation, if there does not exist any chain leading to a literal p (i.e., −Σ p holds),321
then no modification of the theory is possible to prove p.322
+σ : If P(n+1) = +σq then
(1) +∆q ∈ P(1..n) or
(2) ∃r ∈ Rsd [q] such that
(2.1) ∀a ∈ A(r) : +σa ∈ P(1..n) and
(2.2) ∀s ∈ R[∼q]∃a ∈ A(s) such that
−∂a ∈ P(1..n) or s 6> r.
−σ : If P(n+1) =−σq then
(1) +∆q 6∈ P(1..n) and
(2) ∀r ∈ Rsd [q] :
(2.1) ∃a ∈ A(r) such that −σa ∈ P(1..n) or
(2.2) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that
∀a ∈ A(s) : +∂a ∈ P(1..n) and s > r.
Notice that the definitions given above for ±σ are weak forms of the notion of support323
proposed in [15,13] for the definition of an ambiguity propagating variant of Defeasible324
Logic, in the sense that these definitions are less selective than the ones of [15].325
The undefeated chain that allows to state +σ p may be a good candidate for the326
revision process in order to defeasibly prove p.327
+ω: If P(n+1) = +ωq then
(1) +∆q ∈ P(1..n) or
(2) ∃r ∈ Rsd [q] such that ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P(1..n).
−ω: If P(n+1) =−ωq then
(1) +∆q 6∈ P(1..n) and
(2) ∀r ∈ Rsd [q] : ∃a ∈ A(r) such that −∂a ∈ P(1..n).
The chain that allows to state +ω p represents a defeasible proof for p that can only328
fail on the last derivation step. Thus, possible modifications can focus on this last step329
instead of considering the whole chain.330
+ϕ: If P(n+1) = +ϕq then
(1) +∆q ∈ P(1..n) or
(2) ∃r ∈ Rsd [q] such that
(2.1) ∀a ∈ A(r) : +ϕa ∈ P(1..n) and
(2.2) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] : ∃a ∈ A(s) such that −Σa ∈ P(1..n).
−ϕ: If P(n+1) =−ϕq then
(1) +∆q 6∈ P(1..n) and
(2) ∀r ∈ Rsd [q] :
(2.1) ∃a ∈ A(r) such that −ϕa ∈ P(1..n) or
(2.2) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that ∀a ∈ A(s) : +Σa ∈ P(1..n).
The definition of +ϕ ensures that it is not possible to have a counter-argument for a331
reasoning chain, i.e., a proof, for a literal tagged with it. In particular, we can not have332
a direct attack, nor an attack to one of its arguments. Therefore, no modification on the333
superiority relation is possible to reject a literal tagged with +ϕ .334
Given the above definitions, it is straightforward to derive the implication chains335
reported below in Figure 1(a) – (b) using techniques presented in [16].336
+∆ +ϕ +∂
+ω
+σ
+Σ
(a) Positive implication chain
−∆−ϕ−∂
−ω
−σ
−Σ
(b) Negative implication chain
Fig. 1: Implication chains.
One could be tempted to say that +σ implies +ω (and symmetrically, −ω implies337
−σ ). This is not the case. Indeed, if we consider theory D of Example 1, we have: (i.)338
+ωd and −σd, (ii.) +σ¬c and −ω¬c.339
To better explain how the new proof tags behave, we report in Table 1 the set of340
all conclusions. For each literal, we only report the proof tag which is minimal with341
respect to the orderings given in Figure 1. For example, +∂a means that we prove342
+ωa,+σa,+Σa, but −ϕa. If no tag is reported, then it is not possible to derive the343
literal with any tags with respect to the ordering given in Figure 1.344
a b c d e f p
+ +∂ +σ +∂ +ω +ϕ +ϕ +∂
− −ϕ −∂ −∂ −σ −ϕ
¬a ¬b ¬c ¬d ¬e ¬ f ¬p
+ +ω +σ +σ +∂
− −∂ −∂ −ω −ϕ −Σ −Σ −Σ
Table 1: Conclusions for literals in Example 1.
We report now some theoretical results: these are useful during the revision process345
described in Section 4. Proposition 3 highlights the fact that, given a theory D and literal346
q, if D ` +ϕq then there are no chains for the complementary. Notice that, in general,347
the opposite does not hold (as for literal p in Example 1).348
Proposition 3 Given a consistent defeasible theory D, if D `+ϕ p for a literal p (with349
p 6∈ F), then D ` −Σ∼p.350
Proof. The proof straightly follows from the definition of +ϕ , condition (2.2). This351
condition must hold for each element in the chain, as well as for p.352
The next proposition formally states the following idea: given a defeasibly proved353
literal p and a chain leading to∼p with all the antecedents defeasibly proved, then such354
a chain is defeated by a priority rule at the last proof step (by the rule proving p).355
Proposition 4 Given a consistent defeasible theory D, if D `+∂ p and D `+ω∼p for356
a literal p (with p 6∈ F), then D ` −σ∼p.357
Proof. By definition of +∂ , we have that the condition below358
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼p] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) :−∂a ∈ P(1..n) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd [p] such that
∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂a ∈ P(1..n) and t > s
holds for p. In fact condition (2.3.2) has to be true since we know condition (2.3.1) is359
not, because360
D `+∂ p implies ∃r ∈ R[p].∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a
D `+ω∼p implies ∃s ∈ R[∼p].∀a ∈ A(s) : +∂a
}
thus
361
∃t ∈ R[p].∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂a and t > s.
This is condition (2.2) for−σ∼p. Moreover, since all the premises of∼p are defeasibly362
proved by hypothesis and we have proved that the chain is defeated, then it has to loose363
on the last proof step.364
We now capture the concept of a derivation based on a contradiction. To do so, we365
begin by defining what the meaning of dependency between literals is; afterwards, we366
look at how the notion of ∂ -unreachability defines literals whose derivation is based367
upon an inconsistency.368
Definition 5 Let a and b be two literals. Then a depends on b iff (1) b = a or (2)369
∀r ∈ R[a], either (2.1) b ∈ A(r), or (2.2) ∃c such that c ∈ A(r), and c depends on b.370
The following result shows that a defeasibly proved literal also implies the provability371
of all literals it depends on. In other words, the property of dependency given above372
propagates backwards the defeasible provability of literals.373
Proposition 6 Given a defeasible theory D, if D ` +∂ p and p depends on q, then374
D `+∂q.375
Proof. The proof is by case inspection of Definition 5. If clause (1) holds, the claim376
trivially follows. For the other cases, the proof is by induction on the degree of depen-377
dency between literals. A literal a depends on b with degree 1 if a depends on b and378
there exists a rule r, with C(r) = a and b ∈ A(r). A literal a depends on b with degree379
n+ 1 if a depends on b and there is a literal c such that a depends on c with degree 1380
and c depends on b with degree n.381
For the inductive base (i.e., p depends on q with degree 1), +∂ p means that there is382
a rule for p with every antecedent defeasibly proved. Thus, D `+∂q.383
For the inductive step, suppose that the property holds up to degree n and p depends384
on q with degree n+ 1. By definition, there exists a literal c such that p depends on c385
with degree 1, thus D ` +∂c (given D ` +∂ p by hypothesis) and c depends on q with386
degree n. Thus, by inductive hypothesis, D `+∂q.387
The next definition identifies literals only depending on contradictions. For exam-388
ple, consider the theory with the following rule:389
a,¬a,b⇒r p.
For deriving +∂ p we need both +∂a and +∂¬a, and this is possible only in the case390
that the theory is inconsistent. However, we have also to cater for situations where the391
dependency is not direct, for example in theories like392
a⇒r1 b ¬a,b⇒r2 p.
393
Definition 7 A literal p is ∂ -unreachable iff ∀r ∈ R[p], either (1) ∃l,∃a,b ∈ A(r) such394
that (1.1) a depends on l, and (1.2) b depends on ∼l, or (2) ∃d ∈ A(r) such that d is395
∂ -unreachable. Otherwise, we define p to be ∂ -reachable.396
The result below formalises the relationship between ∂ -unreachable literals and incon-397
sistent theories.398
Proposition 8 Given a theory D, let p be a ∂ -unreachable literal. If D `+∂ p, then D399
is inconsistent.400
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of ∂ -unreachable literals in a derivation.401
For the base case, p is the only ∂ -unreachable literal in its derivation. Given that402
D `+∂ p, there is a rule for p such that all its antecedents are provable. By Definition 7,403
for every rule for p there are two antecedents a and b depending on a literal l and its404
complement, respectively. Thus, we have both +∂a and +∂b. By Proposition 6, we405
have D `+∂ l and D `+∂∼l, then D is inconsistent.406
For the inductive step, we assume that the property holds up to n ∂ -unreachable lit-407
erals, and p is the (n+1)th ∂ -unreachable literal. Beside the case we examined in the in-408
ductive base, we have to consider that the antecedent of a rule contains a ∂ -unreachable409
literal d and D ` +∂d. Thus, d falls under the inductive hypothesis, therefore D is410
inconsistent.411
The following proposition states that if there is a ∂ -reachable literal p with at least412
one supporting chain, then it is always possible to defeasibly prove p. In other words,413
the problem of modifying the superiority relation to pass from −∂ p to +∂ p (or from414
+∂∼p to +∂ p) has always a solution, provided that there exists a non-contradictory415
support.416
Proposition 9 Given a consistent defeasible theory D = (F,R,>) and a ∂ -reachable417
literal p with D `+Σ p, there exists a theory D′ = (F,R,>′) such that D′ `+∂ p.418
Proof. Proposition 8 shows that a ∂ -unreachable literal is provable only when the the-419
ory is inconsistent, which is against the hypothesis of the proposition.420
Suppose that D `+Σ p for a theory D. Then, there is at least one reasoning chain C421
supporting p. Among all the possible superiority relations based on F and R, there is a422
superiority relation >′ where every rule r : A⇒ c in C is superior to any rule for ∼c.423
Thus, theory D′ = (F,R,>′) is such that D′ `+∂ p.424
To illustrate why both conditions of Proposition 9 are required to guarantee that the425
canonical case whose outcome is +∂ p after the revision operation, let us consider a426
theory with the following rules:427
⇒r1 a
⇒r2 ¬a
a,¬a⇒r3 p.
In this case we have both +Σa and +Σ¬a, therefore we can build a reasoning chain to428
p, but p itself is ∂ -unreachable because it depends on a contradiction. Thus, there is no429
way to change the previous theory to prove p.430
We end this section proposing an example to translate a real-life case into our logic. This431
will also help in giving an intuitive revision mechanism that shows how argumentation432
in legal reasoning is easily mapped in changing the superiority relation of a defeasible433
theory.434
Example 2. A couple can have offspring but, since both mother and father are affected435
of cystic fibrosis, they know that every their child will be most likely affected by the436
same genetic anomaly. Since they want their offspring to be healthy, they request for437
medically assisted reproduction techniques. Their case is disputed first in an Italian438
Court where the judge has to establish which between Art. 4 of Italian Legislative Act439
40/20043 (r0 and r1) and the standard common medical practice (r3) in force in 15440
countries of the EU prevails.441
The couple is indeed able to produce embryos and they cannot be considered as442
sterile (r2). This makes both Art. 4 and the standard common medical practice to be443
applicable to their case. The judge argues in favour of r1 based on lex superior and444
refuses their request: this principle applies since Art. 4 Act 40/2004 is a legal rule while445
r3 has a juridical validity but it is not a proper legal rule.446
3 Art. 4 of Italian Legislative Act 40/2004: “The recourse to medically assisted reproduction
techniques is allowed only [. . . ] in the cases of sterility”.
F = {Embryo, GeneticAnomalies}
R = {r0 : ¬CandidateInVitroFertilization⇒¬Techniques,
r1 : ¬Sterility⇒¬CandidateInVitroFertilization,
r2 : Embryo⇒¬Sterility,
r3 : ¬Sterility,GeneticAnomalies⇒ CandidateInVitroFertilization,
r4 : ¬Sterility,GeneticAnomalies⇒¬Healthy
r5 : GeneticAnomalies,CandidateInVitroFertilization⇒ Healthy}
>= {(r1,r3)}.
The couple appeals to the European Court for Human Rights. The Court establishes that447
not permitting the medical techniques would demote the goal of family health promoted448
by Article 8 of the Convention. In our example, r3 promotes the goal of family health449
(r5), and thus we invert the priority between r1 and r3 based both on lex superior and450
lex specialis (>′= {(r3,r1)}). In here, the lex superior principle applies because r3 is451
an european directive, while the lex specialis principle applies because r3 covers a more452
specific case than r0.453
4 Changing defeasible preferences454
We now analyse the processes of revision in a defeasible theory, when no changes to455
rules and facts are allowed. Henceforth, when no confusion arises, every time we speak456
about a (revision) transformation we refer to a (revision) transformation acting only on457
the superiority relation.458
A good starting point for our investigation is to focus on the corresponding decision459
problem (i.e., answering the question if it is possible to modify the state of a literal460
in a defeasible theory by changing the relative strength of rules) and characterise it461
in a formal way (so as to be able also to answer the question when). In particular,462
in Subsection 4.1 we show that the decision problem at hand is computationally hard463
in general, while in the remaining of the section we partition the decision problem in464
three sub-cases which correspond to the possible ways in which we can modify the465
(provability) state of a literal.466
4.1 NP-Completeness467
First, we introduce some additional terminology. Definition 10 constructs a defeasible468
theory starting from a fixed set of rules and an empty set of facts. This formulation limits469
the revision problem to preference changes, notwithstanding the particular instance of470
the superiority relation.471
Definition 10 Given a set of defeasible rules R, a defeasible theory D is based on R iff472
D = ( /0,R,>).
The aim of Definition 11 is to specify the possible relationships between a literal473
and all theories based on a set of rules R.474
Definition 11 Given a set of defeasible rules R, a literal p is475
1. >-R-tautological iff for all theories D based on R, D `+∂ p.476
2. >-R-non-tautological iff there exists a theory D based on R such that D 6`+∂ p.477
3. >-R-refutable iff there exists a theory D based on R such that D ` −∂ p.478
4. >-R-irrefutable iff for all theories D based on R, D 6` −∂ p.479
The notion of>-R-irrefutable represents the negative counterpart of>-R-tautological;480
the same holds for >-R-refutable and >-R-non-tautological.481
If p is >-R-tautological, then, in every theory based on the set of rules R, an instance482
of the superiority relation such that p is defeasibly refuted does not exist. Accordingly,483
if a literal is >-R-tautological, then we cannot revise it.484
On the contrary, if an instance of the superiority relation where p is no longer prov-485
able exists, then p is >-R-refutable.486
To prove the NP-completeness of the problem of establishing if it is possible to revise a487
theory modifying only the superiority relation, we reduce the 3-SAT problem – a known488
NP-complete problem – to our decision problem. In particular, we are going to map a489
3-SAT formula to a defeasible theory and we check wether the literal corresponding to490
the 3-SAT formula is tautological. Definition 12 exhibits the reduction adopted.491
Definition 12 Given a 3-SAT formula Γ =
n∧
i=1
Ci such that Ci =
3∨
j=1
aij, we define the Γ -
transformation as the operation that maps Γ into the following set of defeasible rules
RΓ = {rai j :⇒ aij
ri j : aij⇒ ci
r∼i :⇒∼ci
ri :∼ci⇒ p}.
The above definition clearly shows that the mapping is polynomial in the number of492
literals appearing in the 3-SAT formula Γ .493
The second step of the proof construction is to ensure that the proposed mapping494
always allows the revision problem to give a correct answer (either positive, or nega-495
tive) for every 3-SAT formula. Proposition 14 and Lemma 15 guarantee that any theory496
obtained by Γ -transformation provides an answer. These results are also intended to497
establish relationships between the notions of tautological and refutable given in Defi-498
nition 11.499
Definition 13 A defeasible theory D is decisive iff for every literal p in D either D `500
+∂ p, or D ` −∂ p.501
Proposition 14 Given a defeasible theory D, if the atom dependency graph of D is502
acyclic, then D is decisive.503
Proof. For a detailed definition of atom dependency graph and a complete proof of the504
claim, the interested reader should refer to [17].505
Lemma 15 Any defeasible theory D based on RΓ of Definition 12 (for any Γ ) is deci-506
sive.507
Proof. It is easy to verify by case inspection that the atom dependency graph is acyclic.508
We are now ready to introduce the main result of NP-completeness. First of all, we509
have to prove that the revision problem is in NP. Second, we show that it is NP-hard510
by exploiting the formulation of the 3-SAT problem and the transformation proposed in511
Definition 12.512
Theorem 16 The problem of determining the revision of a defeasible literal by chang-513
ing the preference relation is NP-complete.514
Proof. The proof that the problem is in NP is straightforward. Given a defeasible theory515
D = (F,R,>) and a literal p to be revised, an oracle guesses a revision (in terms of a516
new preference relation >′ applied to D) and checks if the state of p has changed based517
on the extensions of D and D′ = (F,R,>′). The complexity of this check is bound to the518
computation of the extensions of D and D′, which [18] proves to be linear in the order519
of the theory.520
To prove the NP-hardness, given a 3-SAT formula Γ =
n∧
i=1
Ci such that Ci =
3∨
j=1
aij, a521
defeasible theory D based on the set of defeasible rules RΓ obtained byΓ -transformation,522
and a literal p in D, we show that:523
(1) if p is >-RΓ -tautological, then Γ is not satisfiable;524
(2) if p is >-RΓ -non-tautological, then Γ is satisfiable.525
(1) Lemma 15 allows us to reformulate the contrapositive using >-RΓ -refutable. If Γ is526
satisfiable, then there exists an interpretation I such that527
I  Γ ⇐⇒ I 
n∧
i=1
Ci
⇐⇒ I C1 and . . . and I Cn
⇐⇒ I 
3∨
j=1
a1j and . . . and I 
3∨
j=1
anj .
Thus, for each i, there exists j such that I  aij.528
We build a defeasible theory D′ = ( /0,RΓ ,>′) as follows. If there exists a literal blk529
such that blk = ∼aij, then (rai j,rblk) is in >′. It follows that, by construction, D′ proves530
+∂aij. This means that every rule ri j is applicable and it is not weaker than the corre-531
sponding rule r∼i. Hence, we have −∂∼ci, for all i. Consequently, each rule ri for p is532
discarded and we conclude −∂ p. Accordingly, p is >-RΓ -refutable.533
(2) Again, by Lemma 15, every theory based on RΓ is decisive. Thus, p is >-RΓ -534
refutable. Accordingly, there exists a theory D′ = ( /0,RΓ ,>′) such that D′ `−∂ p. Given535
that RΓ [p] 6= /0 and RΓ [∼p] = /0 by construction, every rule for p is discarded. Namely,536
we have −∂∼ci, for all i.537
Each rule r∼i is vacuously applicable. Hence, in order to have −∂∼ci, there must538
exist a rule ri j that is applicable. Therefore, for each i there is at least one j such that539
+∂aij.540
We build an interpretation I as follows:4541
I(aij) = 1 iff D `+∂aij.542
Since for each 1≤ i≤ n, we have I(aij) = 1 for at least one j, then also I Ci for all i,543
and we conclude that I  Γ .544
In addition, Theorem 16 specifies that there are situations where it is not possible to545
revise a literal only using the superiority relation. For example, if we take a 3-SAT546
formula which is a tautology, the Γ -transformation generates a theory that cannot be547
revised only using the superiority relation. Thus, we can formulate the following result.548
549
Corollary 17 There are theories and literals for which a revision modifying only the550
superiority relation is not possible.551
4.2 Revision in Legal Domain552
Similarly to what we did in Section 2, we now motivate the types of changes we are553
going to study by appealing again to the legal domain. When two lawyers dispute a554
case, there are four situations in which each of them can be if she revises the superiority555
relation employed by the other one.556
(a) The revision process supports the argument of reasonable doubt. Someone proves557
that the rules imply a given conclusion. If the preference is revised then we can de-558
rive that this is not the case, showing that the conclusion was not beyond reasonable559
doubt.560
(b) The revision process beats the argument of beyond reasonable doubt. Analogously561
to situation (a), someone proves that the rules do not imply a given conclusion. If562
the preference is revised, then we can derive that this is indeed the case.563
(c) The revision process supports the argument of proof of innocence/guilt. Someone564
proves that the rules imply a given conclusion. If the preference is revised, then we565
can derive that the opposite holds.566
(d) The revision process cannot support a given thesis.567
Revising a defeasible theory by changing only the priority among its rules means study-568
ing how an hypothetic revision operator works in the three cases reported below:569
4 We use the standard notation where I(a) = 1 iff a is evaluated to True in I, and I(a) = 0
otherwise.
(1) how to obtain −∂ p, starting from +∂ p;570
(2) how to obtain +∂∼p, starting from +∂ p;571
(3) how to obtain +∂ p, starting from −∂ p.572
We name these three revisions canonical. We provide an exhaustive analysis, based on573
the definitions above, in the next subsections.574
Situation (a) corresponds to canonical case (1). Situation (b) corresponds to canon-575
ical case (3). Situation (c) corresponds to canonical case (2).576
Situation (d) includes several contexts that are deemed as sub-cases of the previ-577
ous ones: in particular, it captures cases where indeed, the revision process based the578
superiority relation is impossible, namely:579
– in the first canonical case, when literal p is >-R-tautological (by Definition 11);580
– in the second canonical case, when literal p is >-R-tautological, or a reasoning581
chain supporting the complementary does not exist (i.e., condition −Σ∼p holds);582
– in the third canonical case, when literal p is ∂ -unreachable (as stated in Propo-583
sition 8), or a reasoning chain supporting it does not exist (i.e., condition −Σ p584
holds).585
Notice that literals provable with tag+ϕ are special cases of tautological literals (cf.586
Definition 11). As such, this kind of literals leads the revision process to be unsuccessful587
for the first and the second canonical case. A possible legal scenario is when one of the588
parties argues in favour of a thesis in a defeasible way and the counter-part cannot589
discredit it, or cannot exhibit a proof for the opposite, independently of the changes in590
the superiority relation. The next proposition formally captures the above intuitions.591
Proposition 18 Given a consistent defeasible theory D = (F,R,>), if D ` +ϕ p for a592
literal p, then there does not exist a theory D′ = (F,R,>′) such that (1) D′ `+∂∼p, or593
(2) D′ ` −∂ p.594
Proof. (1) Given any theory, to obtain a defeasible proof of a literal q, there must exist595
at least one reasoning chain supporting q, i.e., +Σq must hold. This is in contradiction596
with Proposition 3 which states that if +ϕ∼q holds, also −Σq does.597
(2) By definition of +ϕ p, there exists a reasoning chain that defeasibly proves p598
made of elements such that there does not exist any rule for the opposite conclusion.599
Thus, no attack to this chain is possible, and condition (2.3.1) of +∂ always holds for600
each element of this chain (we recall that −Σ l implies −∂ l for any literal l).601
In the rest of the section we are going to describe three types of revision of prefer-602
ences. For each case we identify the conditions under which such revisions are possible.603
Therefore, all revision cases studied below will not consider tautological literals as well604
as ∂ -unreachable literals, assuming that the underlying theories are consistent.605
Given a defeasible theory D a literal p can be proved (i.e., +∂ p) or refuted (i.e.,606
−∂ p). The three canonical cases cover the situations where: we pass from a theory607
proving p to a theory refuting p (without necessarily proving the opposite, ∼p); we608
pass from a theory refuting p to a theory proving p; and from a theory proving p to a609
theory proving its opposite (∼p), and then consequently refuting p. Notice that these610
three cases are the only ones meaningful involving provable and refutable literals. In611
Section 5, we are going to argue that our canonical cases can be understood as expan-612
sion, revision and contraction of the AGM belief revision framework. Combinatorially,613
one could consider another case, where p is refuted and we want to obtain a theory614
where we refute ∼p. However, the meaning of this operation is not clear to us, and it is615
partially subsumed by our third canonical case (given that +∂ p implies −∂∼p).616
We are now ready to go onto the systematic analysis of the combinations arising617
from the above defined model. We list the cases by tagging each macroscopic case by618
the name Canonical case and the combinations depending upon the analytical schema619
introduced above by the name Instance. The instances show the combination of proof620
tags where a canonical revision is possible, as well as how to operate on the theory to621
perform the revision. Where necessary, a general reasoning chain supporting a literal p622
will be denoted as Pp.623
4.3 First canonical case: from +∂ p to −∂ p624
For the sake of clarity, Figure 2 gives a tree-based graphical representation of all anal-625
ysed instances: for example, the leftmost leaf (labeled as+σ∼p) represents the instance626
where conditions are +σ∼p, +ω∼p, −ϕ p and +Σ∼p. The scheme will be reprised627
also in the two remaining canonical cases, with the appropriate graphical modifications628
for the particular case.629
From +∂ p to −∂ p
(−ϕ p∧+Σ∼p)
+ω∼p
+σ∼p −σ∼p
−ω∼p
+σ∼p −σ∼p
Fig. 2: From +∂ p to −∂ p: revision cases.
Instance −Σ∼p∧+∂ p: this case is not reported in Figure 2, but nonetheless it rep-630
resents a case worth considering. This means there is no supporting chains for ∼p, so631
we cannot operate on them. Given −ϕ p, there exists at least one of its premises that632
could be defeated by a rule leading to the opposite conclusion. Thus, in order to obtain633
−∂ p, we have to revise the theory allowing at least one of such rules to be able to fire634
(to defeat, or at least to have the same power of a rule which actually proves one of the635
antecedents in the chain supporting p).636
Instance +ω∼p∧+σ∼p: as stated in Proposition 4, this branch represents an impos-637
sible case for any consistent defeasible theory.638
Instance +ω∼p∧−σ∼p: by the straightforward implication of Proposition 4, the639
chain supporting ∼p fails on the last proof step, defeated by priorities for rules which640
defeasibly prove p. Thus, we have only to erase these priorities.641
Instance −ω∼p∧+σ∼p: since a chain P∼p exists, and is never defeated (condition642
−ω∼p only illustrates that such a chain fails before the last proof step), a revision643
process does not have to operate on a chain supporting p. We have to strengthen P∼p by644
changing many priorities in order to let a rule in P∼p obtain at least the same strength645
of such a rule in Pp. In this process, we do not remove any priority among elements in646
Pp, but only add priorities to let a rule in P∼p win.647
Instance −ω∼p∧−σ∼p: the reasoning chain P∼p supporting ∼p is defeated, but648
not necessarily by a chain Pp proving p. The case is analogous to the aforementioned649
instance, but (1) we probably have to act not only on P∼p, but also on Pp, and (2) not650
only introduce priorities, but erase or invert them. This case represents the most generic651
situation, where less information is given: a revision is possible, but we do not know a652
priori where to change the theory.653
4.4 Second canonical case: from +∂ p to +∂∼p654
By following the cases depicted in Figure 2, we explain how a revision operator should655
work by changing the root label to “+∂ p to+∂∼p” and starting from the same premises656
(−ϕ p∧+Σ∼p). Once more, our revision tree does not take into account tags ±ϕ for657
the same reasons explained at the beginning of Section 4.658
Instance +ω∼p∧+σ∼p: as stated in Proposition 4 this branch represents an impos-659
sible case for any consistent defeasible theory.660
Instance+ω∼p∧−σ∼p: Proposition 4 states that the chain supporting∼p is defeated661
on the last proof step. This, combined with −σ∼p, implies that the last step is defeated662
by a priority for the rule which defeasibly proves p. In fact, there may exist more than663
one defeated chain for∼p on the last step, as well as more than one chain which proves664
p. We propose two different approaches. We name P the set of chains defeasibly proving665
p, Pls ⊆ P the set of chains that defeasibly prove p for which there is a priority that666
applies at the last proof step (against a chain that proves ∼p), and N the set of chains667
for which the premises hold:668
1. We choose a chain in N. We invert the priority for every chain in Pls that wins at the669
last proof step. We introduce a new priority for making it win against any remaining670
chain in P.671
2. In this approach we have two neatly distinguished cases:672
(a) |Pls| > |N|: for every chain in N we invert the priorities on the last proof step.673
For every remaining chain in P, we add a priority between the defeasible rule674
used in the last proof step of a chain in N and the rule used in the last proof675
step of a chain in P (possibly different for each chain in N) such that the chain676
in P is defeated.677
(b) |N| > |Pls|: we choose a number |Pls| of chains in N and invert the priority on678
the step where they are defeated. If at the end of this step there are still chains679
in P that defeasibly prove p, we go on with the method used for the case 2(a),680
focusing on the subset of chains in N modified during the first step.681
These two approaches rely on different underlying ideas. In the first case we want a682
unique winning chain. This makes the revision procedure faster than the second method,683
since we do not have to choose a different chain to manipulate every time. Moreover,684
the number of changes made with the first approach is equal to that of the second one685
in the worst case scenario (in general, it revises the theory with the minimum number686
of changes).687
The strength of the second method relies on the concept of team defeater: we do688
not give power to a single element, but to a team of rules. In the first method the entire689
revision process must be repeated once the winning chain is defeated, while in the690
second method if one of the winning chains is defeated, we have only to apply the691
revision process on it, and not on all the other winning chains.692
Let us consider the following example:693
⇒r1 p ⇒r2 p
∨ ∨
⇒r3 ¬p ⇒r4 ¬p
If the chain for ¬p with rule r4 is chosen as the winning chain, the first approach694
would give {r1 > r3,r4 > r1,r4 > r2} as an output, erasing one priority and introducing695
two, while the second approach would generate the following priority set: {r3 > r1,r4 >696
r2}, erasing two priorities, and introducing two. If a new rule ri defeats r4, it is easy to697
see that in the first case we have to entirely revise the theory (for example, let r3 win698
against r1 and r2), while in the second case we have only to introduce r3 > r2.699
Instance −ω∼p∧+σ∼p: there exists an undefeated chain supporting ∼p. To revise700
the theory, we have to choose one of them and, starting from ∼p, go back in the chain701
to the ambiguity point (where P(i) = +∂ pi∧P(i+1) =−∂ pi+1 holds), and strengthen702
the chain by adding a priority where a rule leading to an antecedent in the chain for ∼p703
and a rule for the opposite have the same strength.704
Instance −ω∼p∧−σ∼p: every chain supporting ∼p is defeated at least one time.705
A plausible solution could be to go back in the chain searching for the point where706
P(i) = +σ pi and P(i+ 1) = −σ pi+1. But this is not enough to guarantee the chain to707
win. Let us consider the following example.708
Example 3. Let D be a theory having the following rules:709
+∂/−∂ +σ/−σ
⇒r1 a ⇒r2 b ⇒r3 c ⇒r4 p
∧
⇒r5 ¬a ⇒r6 ¬c
It is easy to see that the sole condition of r3 winning over r6 is not sufficient: we have710
also to introduce a priority between r1 and r5. Thus, we have to act exactly as in the711
aforementioned case, with the solely difference that every time a rule in the chain sup-712
porting ∼p is defeated, the priority rule has to be inverted.713
4.5 Third canonical case: from −∂ p to +∂ p714
For a proper analysis of this case, condition −∂∼p must hold since otherwise the case715
is analogous of the previous revision from +∂q to +∂∼q. Also, we do not take into716
consideration the case where −Σ p holds: if there are no chains leading to p, then no717
revision to obtain +∂ p is possible. The cases studied in this subsection are reported in718
Figure 3.719
From −∂ p to + ∂ p
(−∂∼p∧+Σ p)
+ω p∧+σ p −ω p
(−ω∼p)
+σ p −σ p
Fig. 3: From −∂ p to +∂ p: revision cases.
Notice that +ω p and −σ p cannot hold at the same time: if all the premises for p720
are proved, then the chain fails on the last step, i.e., it has to be defeated by a firing rule721
for ∼p. This would defeasibly prove ∼p, but this cannot happen since we have stated722
that−∂∼p holds. Furthermore,−ω p implies that−ω∼p holds as well, since if it is not723
the case, we would have either +ω p, or +∂∼p, which are both against the hypothesis.724
Instance+ω p∧+σ p: we choose one of the chains where condition+ω p∧+σ p holds,725
and introduce as many priorities as the number of chains where +ω∼p holds.726
Instance −ω p∧+σ p: this case is analogous to instance −ω∼p∧+σ∼p of canonical727
case from +∂ p to +∂∼p.728
Instance −ω p∧−σ p: this case is analogous to instance −ω∼p∧−σ∼p of canonical729
case from +∂ p to +∂∼p.730
731
We remark that conditions ±σ∼p are not useful for the revision process, since they do732
not give information whether the changes will affect chains for ∼p, or not. Example 4733
shows that, even if +σ¬p holds, two distinct revisions exist: the first involves the chain734
for ¬p (introducing r1 > r3), the second does not (introducing r5 > r6).735
Example 4. Let D be a theory having the following rules:736
⇒r1 a ⇒r2 p
⇒r3 ¬a⇒r4 ¬p
⇒r5 b ⇒r6 p
⇒r6 ¬b
An analogous situation is proposed for −σ∼p in Example 5.737
Example 5. Let D be a theory having the following rules:738
⇒r1 a ⇒r2 p
⇒r3 ¬a⇒r4 b ⇒r5 ¬p
∧
⇒r6 ¬b
⇒r7 c ⇒r8 p
⇒r9 ¬c
In here, two revisions exist: one introducing r1 > r3, and the other one which introduces739
r7 > r9.740
Notice that in all the canonical cases, the revision mechanism guarantees that no cycle741
can be introduced. We can formulate this result, which is a straightforward consequence742
of the case analysis presented here.743
Theorem 19 Revising a superiority relation generates a superiority relation.744
5 AGM postulates analysis745
The aim of this section is to study the canonical cases described in Section 4 from the746
point of view of the AGM approach. In particular, we try to relate the canonical cases747
with the types of theory change analysed by Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson in748
their seminal work [3] as far as possible. Afterwards, we focus on understanding the749
meaning of the various AGM postulates in terms of the changes we proposed. This750
allows us then to identify which of the AGM postulates are satisfied by our canonical751
cases.752
This research issue is motivated, as introduced in Section 1, by the fact that the753
AGM postulates analysis in non-monotonic formalisms is still controversial, and thus754
open to discussion.755
We recall that Delgrande proposed an approach to belief revision of logic programs756
under answer set semantics that is fully compliant with the base AGM postulates for757
revision [5]. He also claims in a later work [6, p. 568] that the third and fourth postulates758
for belief revision are not appropriate for belief revision of non-monotonic theories, and759
thus are ignored in his work. However, we are going to argue that these two postulates760
can be adopted in our approach, which suggests that the question whether the AGM761
postulates are suitable for non-monotonic reasoning is still open.762
In the remainder we assume that the reader is familiar with the terminology used in763
the AGM framework, in particular with the notions of belief, belief set, and theory5.764
To adjust the AGM framework in the perspective of preference revision, we first765
rephrase the concept of extension into that of belief set corresponding to a defeasible766
theory.767
5 Notice that in our framework the hypothesis of completeness of a theory does not hold in
general, as it could be the case that in a defeasible theory neither +∂ p, nor +∂∼p is derivable.
Definition 20 Let D = (F,R,>) be a defeasible theory. Then768
BS(D) = BS+∂ (D)∪BS−∂ (D)
is the belief set of D, where769
BS+∂ (D) = {p | p is a literal appearing in D and D `+∂ p},
BS−∂ (D) = {p | p is a literal appearing in D and D ` −∂ p}.
We also state that when a literal p is believed, p ∈ K in AGM notation, then p ∈770
BS+∂ (D). Conversely, if a literal is not believed, i.e., p /∈ K, then p ∈ BS−∂ (D)6. In-771
tuitively, the idea is that if we prove +∂ p then we believe in p, and if we prove −∂ p772
then we do not believe in p.773
In the remainder of the section, we relate the AGM operators of contraction, expansion,774
and revision, and then reframe the corresponding postulates of AGM in the terminology775
of defeasible theories (in Subsections 5.1–5.2).776
Belief contraction is the process of rationally removing from a belief set K a certain777
belief ψ previously in the set. From the point of view of Defeasible Logic, by Definition778
20, a defeasible theory D = (F,R,>) where D ` +∂ p (i.e., p ∈ BS+∂ (D)) is modified779
such that −∂ p holds in the contracted theory (denoted by D−p ) after the process (i.e.,780
p ∈ BS−∂ (D−p )). For the above reasoning, it seems reasonable to argue that the process781
of belief contraction as formalised in AGM approach corresponds to our first canonical782
case, i.e., from +∂ p to−∂ p. If we consider a set of literals C = {p1, . . . , pn}, we define783
the contracted theory D−C as the theory where for each pi ∈C, pi ∈ BS−∂ (D−C ).784
Belief revision is the process of rationally deleting a certain belief ψ from a belief785
set K and adding its opposite. From the point of view of Defeasible Logic, by Definition786
20, a defeasible theory D = (F,R,>) where D ` +∂∼p (i.e., ∼p ∈ BS+∂ (D) and p ∈787
BS−∂ (D)) is modified such that +∂ p holds in the revised theory (denoted by D∗p) after788
the process (i.e., p ∈ BS+∂ (D∗p)). Remember that in Defeasible Logic ∼p now belongs789
to BS−∂ (D∗p). For the above reasoning, it seems reasonable to argue that the process790
of belief revision as formalised in AGM approach corresponds to our second canonical791
case, i.e., from +∂∼p to +∂ p.792
Belief expansion is the process of adding a certain belief ψ to a belief set K. It is793
possible to consider two interpretations of the expansion process: the first where we794
simply force the belief in, the second where a belief is added if the opposite is not795
believed. Our third canonical case, i.e., from −∂ p to +∂ p, follows the second strategy.796
Therefore, from the point of view of Defeasible Logic, by Definition 20 this process797
describes the case of an initial defeasible theory D = (F,R,>) where D ` −∂ p and798
D ` −∂∼p (i.e., p,∼p ∈ BS−∂ (D)) hold being modified such that +∂ p holds in the799
expanded theory (denoted by D+p ) after the process (i.e., p ∈ BS+∂ (D+p )). Remember800
6 Notice that it is possible that a literal p and its complement do not belong to BS(D). For
example, consider the theory consisting only of p⇒ p and ¬p⇒¬p. In this theory none of
±∂ p and ±∂¬p is provable.
that in Defeasible Logic ∼p still belongs to BS−∂ (D+p ). If we consider a set of literals801
C = {p1, . . . , pn}, we define the expanded theory D+C as the theory where for each pi ∈802
C, pi ∈ BS+∂ (D+C ).803
5.1 Preference contraction804
Throughout this subsection, we assume that D `+∂ p for a literal p in D.805
The first postulate in AGM belief contraction states that when a belief set is contracted
by a sentence p, the outcome should be logically closed. In Defeasible Logic, we dis-
tinguish between a theory (i.e., a set of rules), and its extension (i.e., its set of conclu-
sions). In general, given an extension in Defeasible Logic, there are multiple (possibly
not equivalent) theories that generate the extension. This means that in AGM there is no
difference to contract a theory or its base, while it is not the case in Defeasible Logic.
D−p is a theory.(K−˙1)
As preference contraction acts only on the superiority relation, to ensure that a con-806
traction operation satisfies the postulate, we only have to check if the operation itself807
does not create a cycle in the superiority relation. This is guaranteed by the following808
proposition.809
Proposition 21 Given a defeasible theory D = (F,R,>), if D′ = (F,R,>′) is obtained810
from D by erasing preference tuples from >, then >′ is acyclic.811
Proof. By contradiction, let us suppose that there is a cycle in >′. Since, by hypothesis,812
>′ is obtained from > by simply removing preference tuples, then each element of >′813
is an element of > and the cycle in >′ is also in >, against the hypothesis.814
The idea of the second AGM postulate for belief contraction is that a contraction re-
moves beliefs, thus a contraction operation always produces a belief set smaller than
the original. AGM focuses only on “positive” beliefs. However, in our framework we
have two possible types of defeasible conclusions (as it turns out also by Definition 20),
thus we have to check the relationships between the elements of the defeasible belief
sets before and after the operation. In particular, since we remove a belief, then the set of
formulae believed should be smaller after the contraction; this also means that the set of
formulae we do not believe is increased by the formula we contract. As a consequence,
the second postulate must be rewritten taking into account the two parts.
BS+∂ (D−p )⊆ BS+∂ (D) and BS−∂ (D−p )⊇ BS−∂ (D).(K−˙2)
This postulate cannot be adopted in our framework because it contradicts the sceptical815
non-monotonic nature of Defeasible Logic. To see this, suppose that we know a and we816
have the rules⇒ p and a⇒¬p. Then a is sceptically provable, and p is not. But if we817
decide to contract a, then p becomes defeasibly provable, thus we have p∈BS−∂ (D) but818
p∈ BS+∂ (D−p ).7 Notice that this behaviour is not confined to the specifics of Defeasible819
Logic, but holds in any sceptical non-monotonic formalism.820
The third postulate of AGM considers the case when a belief ψ is not in the initial belief
set. As we have already discussed, AGM focuses on a classical notion of consequence
relation, thus if ψ is not a consequence of the theory, then there is no reason to change
anything at all. In Defeasible Logic, this corresponds to not being able to prove p.
Accordingly, we can state that p ∈ BS−∂ (D).
If p ∈ BS−∂ (D) then BS(D−p ) = BS(D).(K−˙3)
Since we want to obtain a theory where −∂ p holds and by hypothesis p ∈ BS−∂ (D),821
then the postulate trivially holds.822
The fourth AGM postulate states that the only literals that are immutable in the contrac-
tion process are tautologies. Defeasible Logic does not have logical connectives, thus
it is not possible to have tautologies in the classical sense. Nevertheless, the concept
of tautology is that of a statement that cannot ever be refuted, i.e., it is true in every
interpretation. In classical logic, an interpretation is an assignment of truth values to the
propositional atoms, while in Defeasible Logic corresponds to consider a particular set
of propositional atoms as factual knowledge. In the context of this paper, where we as-
sume that the set of facts cannot be changed, the closest thing to an interpretation is an
assignment of the superiority relation. We give the formulation of the success postulate
for contraction using the contrapositive.
If p ∈ BS(D−p ) then D `+∆ p.(K−˙4)
The concept of strict derivation embodied by +∆ cannot fully capture the notion of tau-823
tology as a non-refutable statement, since the proof tag +ϕ indeed denotes the presence824
of a supporting chain made of elements for which there are no rules for the opposite,825
and so de facto a non-refutable argument obtained from defeasible rules.826
Thus, it seems reasonable to reformulate the success postulate for contraction as
follows.
If p ∈ BS(D−p ) then D `+ϕ p.(K−˙4′)
Even this version of the postulate does not hold in Defeasible Logic. Indeed, there exist827
situations where there is a proof for p and it is not possible to change the theory in order828
to make p no longer provable, even if there are opposite literals of some elements for829
every chain supporting p. A simple situation is to take a tautologous 3-SAT formula830
and to generate its Γ -transformation (see Definition 12). There are literals in the theory831
obtained that cannot be contracted. However, there are more cases.832
7 In general, making a literal p no longer defeasibly provable does not imply that −∂ p holds
after the revision process. For example, consider the theory ⇒r p and ¬p⇒s ¬p. The only
way to prevent +∂ p is to impose s> r, but in the resulting theory none of +∂ p and−∂ p holds
(same for ¬p). Notice that in this case the conditions for our canonical cases to succeed do not
hold.
Example 6. Let D be a defeasible theory with the following set of rules:833
⇒r1 l ⇒r2 ¬a
⇒r3 a ⇒r4 p
⇒r5 b ⇒r6 p
⇒r7 ¬l⇒r8 ¬b.
To contract p, we must block both the chains proving p. But, in order to do so, we should834
have that D `+∂ l as well as D `+∂¬l. This is not possible since D is consistent.835
Unfortunately, the rule pattern shown in Example 6 is not a sufficient condition836
to reframe the postulate (K−˙4′). Indeed, as Example 7 shows, it is possible to find837
counter-examples where p can be contracted, as well as counter-examples to counter-838
examples (we refer to Example 8) where, by extending the theory of Example 7 with839
rules {r19, . . . ,r25}, the contraction of p becomes, again, not possible.840
Example 7. Let D be a defeasible theory with the following set of rules:841
⇒r1 a ⇒r2 p
⇒r3 b ⇒r4 p
⇒r5 c ⇒r6 p
⇒r7 l ⇒r8 ¬a
⇒r9 ¬l ⇒r10 ¬b
⇒r11 m ⇒r12 ¬b
⇒r13 ¬m⇒r14 ¬c
⇒r15 n ⇒r16 ¬c
⇒r17 ¬n ⇒r18 ¬a.
To contract p, we must block derivations of +∂a, +∂b and +∂c. This can be ob-842
tained by adding the following tuples to the superiority relation: (r7,r9), (r11,r13) and843
(r15,r17).844
Example 8.
⇒r19 e ⇒r20 p
⇒r21 f ⇒r22 p
n ⇒r23 ¬e
¬n ⇒r24 ¬ f
¬m⇒r25 ¬ f .
To contract p, we must now block derivations also of +∂e, and +∂ f . Derivation of e845
can be blocked only if we prove the antecedent of r23, that is n (the derivation of c is846
blocked as well). This implies that the derivation of f is blocked only if +∂¬m holds847
(the only antecedent of rule r25). We can now operate only on the provability of either848
l, or ¬l. In both cases, one between a or b cannot be refuted.849
In Subsection 4.1 we have shown that, in general, revising a defeasible theory using850
only the superiority relation is an NP-complete problem. This suggests that there might851
not be a simple condition, based on proof tags, that can be computed in polynomial time852
and also guarantees a successful contraction.853
The fifth AGM postulate states that contracting, and then expanding by the same belief
ψ will give back at least the initial theory.
If p ∈ BS+∂ (D) then BS(D)⊆ BS((D−p )+p ).(K−˙5)
This postulate cannot be adopted since, once the contracted theory has been obtained,854
the backward step does not uniquely correspond to expanding the obtained theory by855
the same literal, as the following example shows.856
Example 9. Let D be a defeasible theory having the following rules:857
⇒r1 a ⇒r2 p
∨
⇒r3 ¬a
⇒r4 b ⇒r5 p
⇒r6 ¬b
If we contract D by p, in the contracted theory the preference r1 > r3 is no longer858
present. If we now expand D−p , one solution is the initial theory, but also the theory859
containing the preference r4 > r6 is another valid solution.860
Nevertheless, if all operations in the contraction process can be traced, then we can861
easily backtrack and obtain the initial theory, satisfying the postulate.862
The sixth AGM postulate, also known as the postulate of the irrelevancy of syntax,
states that if two beliefs ψ and χ are logically equivalent, then contracting by ψ and
contracting by χ produce the same result.
If ` p≡ q then BS(D−p ) = BS(D−q ).(K−˙6)
In the framework of Defeasible Logic, the language is restricted to literals, thus two863
elements p and q are equivalent only if they represent the same literal. For this reason,864
the sixth postulate straightforwardly follows.865
The seventh and the eighth postulate are best understood if seen in combination. They
essentially relate two individual contractions with respect to a pair of sentences ψ and
χ , with the contraction of their conjunction ψ ∧ χ . As already stated, in Defeasible
Logic there are no logical connectives, and a conjunction of literals is equivalent to the
set of the same literals; the same reasoning used to introduce postulate (K−˙2) applies
here. Thus, the two postulates can be rewritten as
BS+∂ (D−p )∩BS+∂ (D−q )⊆ BS+∂ (D−p,q) and
BS−∂ (D−p )∩BS−∂ (D−q )⊇ BS−∂ (D−p,q).
(K−˙7)
If p ∈ BS−∂ (D−p,q) then BS+∂ (D−p,q)⊆ BS+∂ (D−p ) and
BS−∂ (D−p )⊆ BS−∂ (D−p,q).
(K−˙8)
Postulates (K−˙7) and (K−˙8) do not hold for the same reason formulated for postulate866
(K−˙2). The following example shows the truth of the statement for both of them.867
Example 10. Let D be a defeasible theory having the following rules:868
⇒r3 ¬a
∧
⇒r1 a ⇒r2 c
∨
⇒r3 ¬c ¬c,¬d⇒r4 p
⇒r5 ¬d ∨
∧ ⇒r6 ¬p
⇒r7 b ⇒r8 d
∨
⇒r9 ¬b
In this theory, we have BS+∂ (D) = {a,b,c,d,¬p}, and BS−∂ (D) = {¬a,¬b,¬c,¬d, p}.869
Let us contract D by literal a and by literal b (where the contractions are minimal with870
respect to the changes in the superiority relation) obtaining:871
BS+∂ (D−a ) = {b,¬c,d,¬p}
BS+∂ (D−b ) = {a,c,¬d,¬p}
BS−∂ (D−a ) = {a,¬a,¬b,c,¬d, p}
BS−∂ (D−b ) = {¬a,b,¬b,¬c,d, p}.
The respectively intersections are:872
BS+∂ (D−a )∩BS+∂ (D−b ) = {¬p}
BS−∂ (D−a )∩BS−∂ (D−b ) = {¬a,¬b, p}.
We can now contract a and b simultaneously, and obtain873
BS+∂ (D−a,b) = {¬c,¬d, p}
BS−∂ (D−a,b) = {a,¬a,b,¬b,c,d,¬p}
proving our claim.874
Throughout postulates (K−˙1) to (K−˙8) we took care of the transition effects of875
the contraction process, due to the specific nature of positive and negative beliefs in876
Defeasible Logic. However, for each postulate this specificity has no effect. In fact,877
what can be claimed for contractions in BS+∂ extends to BS−∂ , and vice versa.878
For the sake of completeness, we apply the same care to expansion and revision879
cases further on. As it will be clear at the end of each analysis, analogous conclusions880
about the redundancy are derived.881
5.2 Preference revision882
Throughout this subsection, we assume that D `+∂∼p and D `+Σ p for a literal p in883
D.884
The first AGM postulate for revision states that the revision process has to preserve the
logical closure of the initial theory.
D∗p is a theory.(K ∗1)
The reasoning is the same made for the first postulate for contraction and expansion,885
and it assures that also (K ∗1) is satisfied in our framework.886
The second AGM postulate for revision captures the most general interpretation of the-
ory change; the new information ψ is always included in the new belief set, even if
ψ is self-inconsistent, or contradicts some belief of the initial theory. Henceforth, the
complete reliability of the new information is always assumed.
p ∈ BS+∂ (D∗p).(K ∗2)
As by definition of our second canonical case, literal p is forced to be defeasibly proved887
after the process, provided that preconditions +∂∼p and +Σ p hold, the postulate is888
clearly satisfied.889
The third and the fourth postulates of AGM revision explain the relationship between
the revision and the expansion processes. The quintessential meaning is that they are
independent by operators implementing them.
BS+∂ (D∗p)⊆ BS+∂ (D+p ).(K ∗3)
If ∼p ∈ BS−∂ (D) then BS+∂ (D+p )⊆ BS+∂ (D∗p).(K ∗4)
Both the first two canonical cases, starting from an initial theory and considering a890
literal p, operate to obtain a final theory where +∂ p holds. What we have to care about,891
however, are the preconditions for which these two canonical cases apply. The third892
postulate essentially states that every belief which can be derived revising a theory893
by a belief ψ can be also obtained expanding the same initial theory with respect to894
the same belief. This statement is perfectly allowed in our framework; the case where895
both revision and expansion can apply is when +∂∼p (and hence −∂ p) holds in the896
initial theory; in this situation, the two processes behave in the same manner, i.e., they897
calculates the same extensions. However, if we regard at proper expansion, i.e., when898
condition −∂∼p holds, then it is easy to see that the preconditions for expansion and899
revision are mutually exclusive and can not be applied at the same time.900
The fifth AGM postulate states that the result of a revision by a belief ψ is the absurd
belief set iff the new information is in itself inconsistent.
If p is consistent then BS+∂ (D∗p) is also consistent.(K ∗5)
Since by definition a literal p is always consistent, and the extension of a consistent901
theory is also consistent, the postulate is trivially satisfied.902
The sixth AGM postulate for revision follows the same idea of (K−˙6): the syntax of
the new information has no effect on the revision process, all that matters is its content.
Again, it has a natural counterpart in Defeasible Logic.
If ` p≡ q then BS+∂ (D∗p) = BS+∂ (D∗q).(K ∗6)
The reasoning is the same exploited in the counterpart postulate for contraction, and the903
postulate is straightforward.904
The seventh and the eight postulate of AGM revision cope with the revision process
with respect to conjunctions of literals. In the classical AGM framework, the princi-
ple of minimal change takes an important role in the formulation of these postulates.
The revision with both ψ and χ should correspond to a revision of the theory with ψ
followed by an expansion by χ , provided that χ does not contradict the beliefs in the
theory revised by ψ .
BS+∂ (D∗p,q)⊆ BS+∂ ((D∗p)+q ) and BS−∂ ((D∗p)+q )⊆ BS−∂ (D∗p,q).(K ∗7)
If ¬q ∈ BS−∂ (D∗p) then BS+∂ ((D∗p)+q )⊆ BS+∂ (D∗p,q) and
BS−∂ (D∗p,q)⊆ BS−∂ ((D∗p)+q ).
(K ∗8)
Again, since the sceptical nature of Defeasible Logic, these postulates cannot be satis-905
fied. The following example gives a specific case that falsifies them.906
Example 11. Let D be a defeasible theory having the following rules:907
⇒r1 ¬a
⇒r2 a ⇒r3 p
⇒r4 ¬p
⇒r5 b
⇒r6 ¬b
b ⇒r7 p
b ⇒r8 q
⇒r9 ¬q
⇒r10 c ⇒r11 q
Given theory D, we have BS+∂ (D) = {¬p}, while all other literals are in BS−∂ (D). Re-908
vising D for p and q, one possible theory is D∗p,q, obtained operating through the prov-909
ability of literal b and adding the following superiorities: r5 > r6, r7 > r4, and r8 > r9.910
The resulting BS+∂ (D∗p,q), BS−∂ (D∗p,q) are respectively {b,c, p,q}, and {a,¬a,¬b,¬p,¬q}.911
Now, let us consider the revision just by p. A possible solution is D∗p such that912
BS+∂ (D∗p) = {a,c, p}, and BS−∂ (D∗p) = {¬a,b,¬b,¬p,q,¬q}. In this case the revision913
process acts on the provability of literal a, adding r2 > r1, and r3 > r4.914
If we expand D∗p by q, one possible resulting theory is (D∗p)+q (the expansion pro-915
cess now operates on the provability of literal c adding r11 > r9) where BS+∂ ((D∗p)+q ) =916
{a,c, p,q}, and BS−∂ ((D∗p)+q )= {¬a,b,¬b,¬p,¬q}. The intersection of D∗p,q and (D∗p)+q917
is not empty, but neither theory is contained in the other.918
5.3 Preference expansion919
Throughout this subsection, we assume that for a literal p in D both D ` −∂ p and920
D ` −∂∼p. Moreover, +Σ p holds.921
The first AGM postulate for expansion states that if a theory is expanded with a belief
ψ , then the resulting theory is the logical closure of the initial theory.
D+p is a theory.(K+1)
The same idea for postulate (K−˙1) can be exploited, thus the postulate is clearly satis-922
fied.923
The second AGM postulate for expansion assures that a belief ψ for which the expan-
sion is performed always belongs to the belief set of the resulting theory.
p ∈ BS+∂ (D+p ).(K+2)
By the hypotheses given at the beginning of this subsection, the postulate trivially holds924
since the expansion process forces literal p to be defeasibly proved.925
The joint formulation of the third and the fourth AGM postulates for expansion states
that if a belief is already present in the initial belief set, then an expansion process lets
the theory unchanged.
BS+∂ (T )⊆ BS+∂ (T+p ) and BS−∂ (T+p )⊆ BS−∂ (T ).(K+3)
If p ∈ BS+∂ (T ) then BS+∂ (T+p )⊆ BS+∂ (T ) and BS−∂ (T )⊆ BS−∂ (T+p ).(K+4)
Since we aim at obtaining a theory where +∂ p holds, and by hypothesis p ∈ BS+∂ (T ),926
the postulates seen together trivially hold given that, by definition, its premise does not927
hold.928
The fifth AGM postulate states that if a belief set is contained in another one, then the
expansion of both sets wrt the same belief preserves the relation of inclusion.
If BS+∂ (D)⊆ BS+∂ (D′) then BS+∂ (D+p )⊆ BS+∂ (D′+p ).(K+5)
Also in this case, because of the sceptical non-monotonic nature of Defeasible Logic,929
this postulate can not be satisfied, as already pointed out in the explanation of Postulate930
(K−˙2).931
Non-monotonic formalisms derive conclusions that are tagged. The specific nature of
this tagging is that it makes the notion of minimality for a set of conclusions useless. We
can consider minimality only for one given tag, and not for all tags (this is particularly
obvious for formalisms where tags of formulae are interdependently defined). Thus, the
idea of “smallest resulting set” is meaningless in non-monotonic systems. The sixth
AGM postulate assures the minimality of the expanded belief set.
Given a theory D and a belief p,
BS(D+p ) is the smallest belief set satisfying (K+1)− (K+5).
(K+6)
In the perspective of non-monotonic reasoning, the operation of expanding a defeasible932
theory to prove a literal p (only changing the preference relation) necessarily falsifies933
some other literals, previously provable in the initial theory.934
5.4 Preference identities935
In AGM framework a process that defines revision in terms of expansion is available,
suggested by Isaac Levi [19]. The idea is that to revise a theory D by a belief ψ we may
firstly contract D by ¬ψ in order to remove any information that may contradict ψ , and
then expand the resulting theory with ψ . This is know as the Levi identity, which can
be rewritten using our terminology as:
BS(D∗p) = BS((D
−
¬p)
+
p ).(LI)
The following example shows that the Levi identity does not hold in our framework.936
Example 12. Let D be a defeasible theory having the following rules:937
⇒r1 a ⇒r2 p
⇒r3 ¬a
⇒r4 ¬p
⇒r5 b ⇒r6 p
⇒r7 ¬b
If we revise D by p, a possible solution is D∗p such that BS+∂ (D∗p) = {a, p}, and938
BS−∂ (D∗p)= {¬a,b,¬b,¬p}. Now, contracting D by¬p can lead to D−¬p with BS+∂ (D−¬p)=939
{b}, and BS−∂ (D−¬p) = {a,¬a,¬b, p,¬p}. If we expand D−¬p by p, we obtain (D−¬p)+p940
with BS+∂ ((D−¬p)+p ) = {b, p}, and BS−∂ ((D−¬p)+p ) = {a,¬a,¬b,¬p}.941
The Levi identity does not hold as our revision procedure concerns the reasons why942
one belief is obtained and not only whether we have one belief. Thus when there are943
multiple reasons to justify one belief, it is possible to contract the theory in multiple944
ways, and similarly to expand it in multiple ways, and the changes for the contractions945
are not necessarily the ‘opposite’ of those for contraction.946
As Levi Identity relates the revision process in terms of expansion, Harper pro-
posed a method to obtain the contraction using revision [20]; the underlying idea is that
a theory D contracted by a belief ψ is equivalent to the theory containing only the in-
formation that remain unchanged during the process of revising D by ¬ψ . In our terms,
the Harper Identity can be rewritten as
BS(D−p ) = BS(D
∗
¬p)∩BS(D).(HI)
Harper Identity does not hold for the operations we defined in this paper. Example 13947
provides a counter-example to it.948
Example 13. Let D be a defeasible theory having the following rules:949
⇒r1 p ⇒r2 q
∨
∨ ⇒r3 ¬q
∧
⇒r4 ¬p⇒r5 q
The initial belief set is BS+∂ (D) = {p,q} and BS−∂ (D) = {¬p,¬q}. If we contract950
D by p, we obtain a theory D−p such that BS+∂ (D−p ) is {¬q} and BS−∂ (D−p ) contains951
all the other literals. Instead, if we revise the initial theory with ¬p the theory D∗¬p952
where BS+∂ (D∗¬p) = {¬p,q} and BS−∂ (D∗¬p) = {p,¬q} is obtained. The intersections953
between the revised theory and the initial one are BS+∂ (D∗¬p)∩BS+∂ (D) = {q} and954
BS−∂ (D∗¬p)∩BS−∂ (D) = {¬q}.955
Again, the main reason for the failure of the Harper Identity resides in the non-monotonic956
nature of Defeasible Logic, where, in general it is not possible to control the conse-957
quences of a given formula.958
In this section we have provided an interpretation of the AGM postulates for expan-959
sion, contraction and revision in terms of our canonical cases and the operations that960
are possible when the changes operate only on the superiority relation.961
We believe that the contribution of this section is multi-fold. First of all, the defini-962
tion of our canonical cases offer a more precise formal understanding of the intuition of963
the various operations. Second, we reconstructed the postulates for the canonical cases8964
and discuss how to adapt them. The last contribution of the analysis confirms the out-965
come of [2], showing that in general the postulates describing inclusion relationships966
between belief sets before and after a revision operation do not hold for Defeasible967
Logic, and it is unreasonable to expect that they hold for non-monotonic reasoning in968
general.969
6 Related Work970
As far as we are aware of, the work most closely related to ours is that of [21] where the971
authors study, given a theory, how to abduct preference relation to support the derivation972
of a specific conclusion. Therefore the problem they address is conceptually different973
from what we presented in this paper, given that we focus on modifying the superiority974
relation.975
Notice that in non-monotonic reasoning, a revision is not necessarily triggered by976
inconsistencies. [2] investigates revision for Defeasible Logic and relationships with977
AGM postulates. While their ultimate aim is similar to that of the present paper – i.e.,978
8 Notice that while the main analysis in this paper is specific to revision of the superiority relation
of Defeasible Logic, the definition of the canonical cases does not depend on it, and it can be
applied in a much broader context. For example the canonical case from +∂ p to +∂¬p can be
understood as “how do we modify a theory such that before the revision a formula holds, and
after the revision the opposite holds?”; similarly for the other canonical cases.
transforming a theory to make a previously provable (resp. non provable) statement,979
non provable (resp. provable) – the approach is different, and more akin to standard980
belief revision. More precisely, revision is achieved by introducing new exceptional981
rules. Furthermore, they discuss how to adapt the AGM postulates for non-monotonic982
reasoning.983
Our work is motivated by legal reasoning, where preference revision is just one984
of the aspects of legal interpretation. [22,23] propose a Defeasible Logic framework985
to model extensive and restrictive legal interpretation. This is achieved by using revi-986
sion mechanisms on constitutive rules, where the mechanism is defined to change the987
strength of existing constitutive rules. Based on the specific type of norm to modify,988
they propose a revision (contraction) operator which modifies the theory by adding989
(removing) facts, strict rules, or defeaters, raising the question whether extensive and990
restrictive interpretation can be modelled as preference revision operators. An impor-991
tant aspect of legal interpretation is finding the legal rules to be applied in a case: in this992
work we assumed that the relevant rules have already been discovered, and in case of993
conflicts, preference revision can be used to solve them.994
Another work, related to revision of Defeasible Logic is that of [4], where the key995
idea is to model revision operators corresponding to typical changes in the legal do-996
main, specifically, abrogation and annulment. They show that, typically, belief revision997
methodologies are not suitable to changes in theories intended for legal reasoning. Sim-998
ilarly, they show that it is possible to revise theories fully satisfying the AGM postulates,999
but then the outcome is totally meaningless from a legal point of view.1000
The connection between sceptical non-monotonic formalisms and argumentation is1001
well known in literature; in [9], authors adapt Dung’s argumentation framework [24,25]1002
to give an argumentation semantics for Defeasible Logic: first, they prove that Dung’s1003
grounded semantics characterises the ambiguity propagating DL; then, they show that1004
the ambiguity blocking DL is described with an alternative notion of Dung’s acceptabil-1005
ity. The main effort was to establish close connections between defeasible reasoning1006
and other formulations of non-monotonic reasoning.1007
Non-monotonic revision through argumentation was also investigated in [26,27] us-1008
ing Defeasible Logic Programming (DELP). They define an argument revision operator1009
that inserts a new argument into a defeasible logic program in such a way that this ar-1010
gument ends up undefeated after the revision, thus warranting its conclusion, where a1011
conclusion α is warranted if there exists a non-defeated argument supporting it. Despite1012
the meaning given in this work, their concept of defeaters denotes stronger counter-1013
arguments to a given conclusion based on a set of preferences stating which argument1014
prevails against one other.1015
Their work suffers from a main drawback: imposing preferences among arguments1016
(i.e., whole reasoning chains in our framework), instead of single rules, can lead to a1017
situation when an argument is warranted even if all its sub-arguments are defeated.1018
DELP formalism is very similar to Defeasible Logic. Therefore, techniques pro-1019
posed in this work can be easily accommodated to join the framework presented in1020
[26,27].1021
Other works closely related to ours are [28,29,30,31]. They propose extensions of1022
an argumentation framework, Defeasible Logic and Logic Programming, where the su-1023
periority relation is dynamically derived from arguments and rules in given theories.1024
While the details are different for the various approaches, the underlying idea is the1025
same. For example, in [29], it is possible to have rules of the form r : a⇒ (s > t) where1026
s and t are identifiers for rules. Accordingly, to assert that rule s is stronger than rule t1027
we have to be able to prove +∂a and that there are no applicable rules for ¬(s > t). In1028
addition, the inference rules require that instances of the superiority relation are prov-1029
able (e.g., +∂ (s > t)) instead of being simply given (as facts) in >, i.e., (s, t) ∈>. The1030
main difference with these works is that we investigate general conditions under which1031
it is possible to modify the superiority relation in order to change the conclusions of a1032
theory, while they provide specific mechanisms to compute conclusions where the pref-1033
erence relations are inferred from the context. They do not study which are the possible1034
ways to revise a theory. For example, if a literal is >-tautological, no matter how we1035
derive instances of the preference relation, there is no way to prevent its derivation, or1036
to derive its negation.1037
In the scenario where the preferences over rules are computed dynamically, one1038
could argue that it might be possible to encode in the theory the possible ways in which1039
the superiority relation would behave. The problem with this approach is the combina-1040
torial explosion of the number of rules required, since one would have to consider rules1041
with the form a1, . . . ,an ⇒ (ri > r j) for all possible combinations of literals ak in the1042
theory, and also for all possible combinations of instances of >. In both cases there is1043
an exponential number of combinations. Among the works mentioned above, [28] is1044
motivated, as us, by legal reasoning, and they use rules to encode the legal principles1045
we shortly discussed in the introduction.1046
7 Conclusions and further work1047
Over the years Defeasible Logic has proved to be simple but effective practical non-1048
monotonic formalism suitable for applications in many areas. Its sceptical nature allows1049
to have defeasible proofs both for a belief and its opposite, and still be consistent since,1050
at most, one of them can be finally proven. Since from its first formulation in [32], many1051
theoretical aspects of Defeasible Logic have been studied: from its proof theory [12] to1052
relationships to logic programming [33], from variants of the logic [16] to its semantics1053
[9] and computational properties [18]. Furthermore, several efficient implementations1054
have been developed [34,35,36]. Methods to revise, contract, or expand a defeasible1055
theory were first proposed in [2], where the authors studied how to revise the belief set1056
of a theory based on introduction of new rules. The resulting methodology was then1057
compared to the AGM belief revision framework.1058
In this work we took a different approach: since, in many situations, a person cannot1059
change the rules governing a system (a theory) but only the way each rule interact with1060
the others, it seems straightforward to consider revision methodologies of Defeasible1061
Logic where derivation rules are considered as “static” or “untouchable”, and the only1062
way to change a theory with respect to a statement is to modify the relative strength of a1063
rule with respect to another rule, i.e., to modify the superiority relation of the analysed1064
theory.1065
Therefore, we presented in Section 3 the formalism adopted: eight different types of1066
tagged literals were described to simplify the categorisation process and, consequently,1067
the revision calculus. In Section 4, we introduced three canonical cases of possible1068
revisions and systematically analysed every canonical instance. In both sections, we1069
presented several theoretical results on conditions under which a revision process is1070
possible.1071
Upon these theoretical basis, in Section 5, we proposed a systematic comparison be-1072
tween our framework and the AGM postulates. In there, the three canonical cases were1073
compared to the AGM contraction, expansion, and revision: for each belief change op-1074
erator, all the AGM postulates were rewritten using our terminology, and their validity1075
was studied in our framework.1076
The work presented in this paper paves the way to several lines of further investiga-1077
tion to extend the proposed change methodologies.1078
The first extension we want to mention is that where we change the status of a sets1079
of literals instead of a single literal. Studying conditions (supporting chains, proof tags,1080
and so on) to understand when, and where, it is possible to change a theory by more1081
than a single literal is not a trivial issue. Consider the following theory1082
Example 14. D =1083
⇒r1 ¬b⇒r2 q
⇒r3 a ⇒r4 b ⇒r5 p
∧
⇒r6 ¬a.
It is clear it is not possible to change the initial theory if we want to obtain both +∂ p1084
and +∂q.1085
The second extension concerns how to limit the scope of the revision operators.1086
Revision of preferences should not involve minimal defeasible rules. This constraint1087
captures the idea that a rule that wins against all other rules is a basic juridical prin-1088
ciple. A similar aspect is that under given circumstances the revision process should1089
not, for at least a subset of “protected” pairs, violate the original preferential order. For1090
instance, we should not revise those preferences that are unquestioned because derived1091
by commonly accepted principles or explicitly expressed by the legislator, as discussed1092
in the introduction.1093
As we have seen in Section 2, in the legal domain we can identify several sources for1094
the preference relation. Preference handling in Defeasible Logic can gain much from1095
typisation of preferences themselves. The notion of preference type and its algebraic1096
structure has been studied previously and can be applied directly here [37]. Analo-1097
gously, one of the possible directions of generalisation for the notion of preference is1098
the notion of partial order, investigated at a combinatorial level by [38] and then studied1099
from a computational viewpoint in [39].1100
The main aim of the paper was to identify conditions under which revision based on1101
changes of the superiority relation was possible. Accordingly, the next important aspect1102
of belief revision is to identify criteria of minimal change. It is possible to give alterna-1103
tive definitions of minimal revision. For example, one notion could be on the cardinality1104
of instances of the superiority relation, while another one is to consider minimality with1105
respect to the conclusions derived from a theory. A few research questions naturally fol-1106
low: ‘Are there conditions on a theory to guarantee that a revision is minimal?’, or ‘Is it1107
possible to compare different minimality criteria?’.1108
We illustrate some of these issue with the help of the following example.1109
Example 15. Let D be the following theory1110
⇒r1 a ⇒r2 b ⇒r3 p
⇒r4 ¬a⇒r5 ¬b
⇒r6 c ⇒r7 d ⇒r8 e ⇒r9 p
∧
⇒r10 ¬c
1111
>′ = {(r6,r10)}
>′′ = {(r1,r4),(r2,r5)}.
Superiority relation >′ guarantees to change only one preference, but modify the exten-1112
sion of the former theory by five literals (c,¬c,d,e, and p), while >′′, by adding two1113
preferences, changes only three literals (a,b and p).1114
Finally, the present work provides a further indication that the AGM postulates are1115
not appropriate for belief revision of non-monotonic reasoning. Consequently, a natural1116
question is whether there is a set of rational postulates for this kind of logics. We are1117
sceptical about this endeavor: there are many different and often incompatible facets1118
of non-monotonic reasoning, and a set of postulates might satisfy some particular non-1119
monotonic features but not appropriate for others. For example, as we have seen in this1120
paper, if we ignore monotonic conclusions (conclusions tagged with ±∆ ), there are1121
other cases where we cannot guarantee the success of the revision operation. On the1122
other hand, [2] argues that the success postulate for revision holds if we are allowed to1123
operate on rules instead of preferences. This example suggests that it might possible to1124
find a set of postulates, but this would specific to a logic and specific types of operations.1125
The quest for an alternative set of postulates for revision of non-monotonic theories is1126
left for future research.1127
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